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Supply Chain Management under the Threat of 
International Terrorism 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
On the morning of September 11th, 2001, the United States and the Western world 
entered into a new era – one in which large scale terrorist acts are to be expected. The 
impacts of the new era will challenge supply chain managers to adjust relations with 
suppliers and customers, contend with transportation difficulties and amend inventory 
management strategies. 
 
This paper looks at the twin corporate challenges of (i) preparing to deal with the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks and (ii) operating under heightened security. The first 
challenge involves setting certain operational redundancies. The second means less 
reliable lead times and less certain demand scenarios. In addition, the paper looks at how 
companies should organize to meet those challenges efficiently and suggests a new 
public-private partnership. While the paper is focused on the US, it has worldwide 
implications. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author is indebted to Dr. Jim Masters and Mr. Dan Dolgin who provided invaluable 
insights and detailed comments, including extensive editing. Three anonymous referees 
also provided helpful comments. 
  3
 
The Challenge 
 
Within days of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, manufacturers began to 
experience disruptions to the flow of materials into assembly plants. For example, Ford 
had to idle several of its assembly lines intermittently as trucks loaded with components 
were delayed at the Canadian and Mexican borders. Toyota came within hours of halting 
production at its Sequoia SUV plant in Indiana, since a supplier was waiting for steering 
sensors shipped by air from Germany, but air traffic was shut [1].  Ford, Toyota, and 
other manufacturers were vulnerable to transportation disruptions because they operate a 
“Just-in-Time” (JIT) inventory discipline, keeping material on hand for only a few days 
and sometimes only a few hours of operation.  
 
It is instructive to note that these disruptions were not caused by the attack itself, but 
rather by the government’s response to the attack: closing borders, shutting down air 
traffic, and evacuating buildings throughout the country. The federal government is now 
readying its thinking, its institutions, its communications strategy, its military response, 
and its domestic defense strategy for a challenge of fighting terrorism, that is likely to last 
a long time. 
 
Popular wisdom repeatedly recites that the war on terrorism is unlike any past war.  But 
popular wisdom has not yet adapted to the most fundamental way in which this "war" is 
different.  In fact, it is not so much a war as it is a new era of continuous danger.  In 
addition, the defensive aspects of this war will be fought on the home front, not by a 
professional army but by business organizations and ordinary citizens endeavoring to 
make the interdependencies of our economy function for their own benefit, not as the 
weapons of the enemy.  
 
As companies organize to face this new era, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and 
other firms involved in the handling of physical goods face four challenges: 
 
1. Preparing for another attack. Assuming that some future attack will be successful, 
companies must prepare to operate in its aftermath. Firms are vulnerable not only 
to attacks on their own assets, but also to attacks on their suppliers, customers, 
transportation providers, communication lines, and other elements in their eco-
system. 
 
2. Managing supply chains under increased uncertainty. Measures taken by the US 
and other governments to improve homeland defense have burdened the global 
transportation system, creating longer and less reliable lead times. In addition, 
even small terrorist events, which have negligible economic consequences in 
themselves, can have disproportionate effects on demand. 
 
3. Managing relationships with the government. The war on terrorism will bring 
about a new era of public-private cooperation in which companies will reform 
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their relationships with the government. All US citizens and business 
organizations will have a part to play in this war. 
 
4. Organizing to meet the challenge. Actions taken to defend employees, physical 
assets, and intellectual property will consume resources. Companies must 
determine what to do, and how to do it in the most efficient manner, balancing the 
costs and benefits of security needs against other corporate goals. 
 
Preparing for Another Attack 
 
One of the main tenets of military preparedness is the investment in redundancy, which 
can hardly be justified on the basis of its positive net present value. Preparedness is best 
viewed as insurance. We use this framework to analyze investments in three main 
categories: (i) supplier relationships and awards,  (ii) inventory management criteria, and 
(iii) knowledge and process backup. 
Supplier relationships 
 
During the last decade many companies reduced the number of their suppliers, 
developing “core supplier” programs in order to create stronger relationships with fewer, 
key suppliers. A counter trend took hold in the late 1990‘s with the Internet boom. E-
procurement tools and services enable companies to conduct on-line auctions and 
participate in commodity exchanges, expanding the number of firms with whom they do 
business and decreasing costs.   
 
Security considerations are likely to push more companies to abandon public exchanges 
in favor of private auctions (where only known and pre-screened suppliers are allowed to 
participate), or to abandon auctions altogether in favor of long-term relationships with 
suppliers. In the new era companies may worry that their suppliers will ration their output 
in case of a disruption. Clearly, suppliers are likely to allocate products first to customers 
with whom they have long-term relationships, giving this type of relationships added 
value in the new environment.  
 
Since September 11, many US (as well as European) companies are reconsidering the 
wisdom of using overseas suppliers. Offshore suppliers may be less expensive, but 
require longer lead-time and may be more susceptible to disruptions in the transportation 
system. Local suppliers may be more expensive but are closer and therefore able to 
respond faster. 
 
Instead of choosing one alternative over another, the best solution may include both – 
using offshore suppliers for the bulk of the procurement volume while making sure that a 
local supplier has the capability to fill the needs, by giving it a fraction of the business. In 
the terminology of insurance, the incremental cost of using the local supplier is the 
premium paid for the reduced risk of supply-chain disruption. 
 
  5
Consider the following example: a high technology company sells medical devices made 
by a contract manufacturer in Malaysia. The Malaysian supplier delivers the devices at 
$100 a piece and the devices are sold by the US company at $400 each. Fixed costs, 
including marketing and channel setup, have been estimated at $200 per device. Thus, the 
company expects a profit of: 
 
P1 = $400 - $100 - $200 = $100 per device. 
 
The company estimates that there is a 1% probability that the Malaysian supplier will be 
disrupted and will not be able to deliver for an extended period. This will expose the 
company to $200 loss per device since in case of a disruption the company will have no 
sales but will still be burdened with the fixed costs. Taking this into account, the expected 
profit when using the Malaysian supplier is: 
 
P2 = 0.99*($400 - $100) - $200 = $97 per device, 
 
A local supplier can deliver the same devices for $150 each. Under a dual supply 
arrangement the local supplier may be given a portion, say 20% of the business if it 
guarantees to supply all of the company’s requirements should the need arise. If there is 
no disruption, then, the expected profit when using dual manufacturing will be: 
 
P3 = $400 - (0.8*$100 + 0.2*$150) - $200 = $90 per device 
 
If there is a disruption, the local manufacturer will supply the devices and the company’s 
profit will be: 
 
P4 = $400 - $150 - $200 = $50 per device 
 
Taking into account, however, that in case of a disruption the company will be able to use 
the local supplier, the expected profit when operating with dual suppliers is: 
 
P5 = 0.99* P3 + 0.01* P4 = $89.6 per device 
 
Dual manufacturing will cost the company $7.4 per device (P2 – P5) in expected profit. 
This is the insurance premium. The value of the insurance is that if a disruption does 
occur, the company will experience a profit of $50 instead of a loss of $200 per device.  
 
This simple example ignores the time value of money, possible penalties for not 
delivering and many other aspects of reality. It demonstrates, however, the value of 
purchasing the insurance. 
 
Thus, one can expect some jobs to be moving back into the US, as companies trade off 
lower parts costs against delivery reliability. This shift, however, is likely to be neither 
large nor immediate. It is unlikely that companies will forgo the benefits of low cost, high 
quality offshore manufacturing altogether, but rather will only hedge their bets with local 
suppliers. Calculation of the insurance value depends largely on assessment of the 
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probability of a disruptive event.  Even after a decision to dual-source is made, it will 
take time since sourcing decisions are often made several years in advance of product 
launch. The first signs of such strategies should be seen in the high technology sector 
with its short product life cycle and traditionally high reliance on offshore contract 
manufacturing. 
 
Note that dual supply sources are not a new idea and they have general merits beyond 
responding to terror. For example, Billington and Johnson [2] describe how Hewlett 
Packard has used “dual response manufacturing” to supply inkjet printers to North 
America for several years. It used a Vancouver, Washington supplier to launch the 
product and deal with demand peaks, while a low cost Singaporean supplier handled most 
of the stable production. 
Inventory 
 
In response to the terrorist attack of September 11, companies began to question the 
wisdom of “lean operations” using JIT processes. Some companies are ordering parts in 
larger quantities, increasing safety stocks to keep their assembly lines moving “just in 
case” their inbound transportation is disrupted. In addition, they plan to keep more 
finished goods on hand so customers can be supplied even when the manufacturing 
process is disrupted. 
 
The benefits of JIT manufacturing, however, have been immense. Manufacturers not only 
have seen their inventory carrying costs go down -- even more importantly, they have 
seen their product quality improve dramatically. With a JIT system, component quality 
problems are apparent and must be resolved. This discipline is one of the underlying 
principles of the Toyota Manufacturing System, which has been adopted, in one form or 
another, by leading manufacturers in every industry. 
 
The challenge then is to ensure that supply lines are maintained while not incurring the 
high costs of extra inventory. A possible solution, which can again be analyzed by using 
the insurance framework, is to separate the normal business uncertainties from the risk 
associated with another possible terrorist attack, creating, in fact, a “dual inventory” 
system. Under this system, typical forecasting discrepancies and business fluctuations 
should be covered by conventional safety stock.  
 
To mitigate the effect of another terrorist attack, however, manufacturers should maintain 
an additional inventory designated “Strategic Emergency Stock.” This stock is not used 
to buffer day-to-day fluctuations. It can only be used in the case of an extreme disruption. 
The costs of carrying this extra inventory represent the price of the premium for the 
insurance it buys. 
 
It is unreasonable to expect managers to ignore this inventory when a service failure takes 
place in normal times. To make sure that the organization will not simply become 
accustomed to the higher level of inventory, two policies should be adopted: First, the 
strategic inventory should be replenished immediately in a “Sell-One-Store-One (SoSo)” 
  7
discipline regardless of daily forecasts. Second, usage of the strategic inventory should be 
treated in the same way that assembly line shutdowns are treated. In other words, it 
should get top management attention and the root causes fixed at the source. 
 
The concept of Strategic Emergency Stock is similar to the philosophy that led the US to 
keep Strategic Oil Reserves, which are intended to buffer the US against a severe 
disruption in the flow of oil. When these reserves have been used to moderate oil price 
spikes, they have been promptly replenished in order to maintain their availability for 
their primary purpose. A similar “strategic inventory” of certain key medicines is kept by 
hospitals for use in crisis situations. 
Knowledge Backup 
 
The preparations involved in protecting companies’ knowledge involve three main 
efforts: (i) developing backup processes (ii) backing up the company’s knowledge, and 
(iii) backing up the company’s relationships. 
 
Many companies have long understood their total reliance on their information 
technology infrastructure and have established backup sites for their critical hardware, 
software applications, and data 
 
Consider, for example Solomon Smith Barney. The financial services firm had 7,000 
workers in the World Trade Center, all of whom, fortunately, got out in time. The 
company was up and running within twelve hours using a backup New Jersey site and 
invoking a set of emergency backup processes. 
 
Few companies, however, have backup emergency business processes. Such processes 
spell out communications protocols, chains of authority, and decision-making procedures 
in case of damage to systems, losses in personnel and breakdown in communications. 
 
More generally, the most precious resource of nearly every company is the knowledge of 
its workers. Since companies cannot afford to maintain redundant employees around “just 
in case,” companies should insure that their knowledge is backed up. This means that 
critical processes should be documented and that these documents are available. When 
appropriate, cross training should be part of any preparedness effort. 
 
Many companies document business processes when they are designed, but fail to keep 
up with their ever-changing nature as these processes mutate in actual use. This failure 
may be the impetus for a much better set of software applications, which support both the 
processes and their continuous documentation. 
 
In addition to business processes, companies need to be able to salvage customer and 
supplier relationships. These can be protected if all interactions with customers have been 
documented in a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system. Relationships 
should be deemed just as important as data and processes. Documenting all customer 
interactions can help companies pick up after a disaster much quicker. 
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*  *  * 
 
All of these backup activities are a form of insurance premium. Not every preparedness 
action, however, imposes a premium. Some strategies are beneficial to the business at any 
time but take on extra significance when looked upon from the perspective of 
preparedness. One such notion is standardization. One of the most important tools in 
creating redundancy and the ability to recover quickly is standardization of business 
processes and practices across the enterprise. To this end, corporations with several 
warehouse management systems, multiple order entry systems, or several incompatible 
manufacturing and financial systems, are more vulnerable than companies who 
standardized their operations and can move personnel and processes between locations if 
a single location goes down. 
 
Managing Supply Chains Under Increased Uncertainty 
 
Manufacturing supply chains involve a network of enterprises and processes, which turn 
a combination of raw materials into finished products delivered to the consumer. Most 
anti-terrorist measures will reduce the reliability of the network, challenging supply chain 
management processes. 
 
Longer supply lines and system uncertainties are not new problems for supply chain 
managers. The globalization of manufacturing, the explosion of new products, and 
shortened product life cycles have burdened logistics managers with long supply lines 
and significant demand uncertainty. In that sense, the new era does not represent a 
fundamentally new challenge. Thus, the basic problem can be tackled by refocusing on 
known solutions, including (i) improvements in shipment visibility, (ii) improved 
collaboration between trading partners and across enterprises, and (iii) better forecasting 
through risk pooling methods.  
  
Shipment Visibility 
 
Many logistics managers still describe their transportation system as a “black hole” – 
shipments disappear when tendered to the carrier and no information is available to either 
shipper or consignee until the shipment is delivered. Shipment visibility tools allow 
shippers to track the progress of their shipments in the same way that consumers can 
track the flow of their UPS or FedEx shipments. Tracking industrial shipments has 
proved to be a significantly more challenging problem – it involves multiple carriers and 
“hand-offs,” and it requires integration with manufacturing, inventory and purchasing. 
Furthermore logistics managers deal with thousands of items every day and they need to 
know not only what is in-transit, but also what is available in stock, what is on-order, and 
when orders will be available from suppliers. 
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Shipment data visibility allows manufacturers to avoid plant shutdown due to part 
shortages and allows retailers to avoid turning customers away due to unavailability of 
goods. At the same time, good visibility also allows all the players in the supply chain to 
keep lower safety stocks since the demand pattern they experience will be more stable 
and their suppliers will be more consistent. The cost savings associated with better 
forecasting and smoother operations include not only lower inventory carrying costs, and 
the avoidance of expedited shipments; it also means that warehousing facilities can be 
downsized and a significant amount of administrative overhead associated with 
unscheduled activities can be avoided. 
 
There are several partial technology solutions available today for helping shippers find 
out where their shipments are, as well as helping them decide what action to take in case 
a shipment is late, misrouted, damaged, or otherwise in trouble. Some of these solutions 
are available from carriers who are tracking their own conveyance movements, while 
others are available from software providers who are attempting to aggregate the 
information from many carriers, suppliers and their own warehouses and present it to 
shippers in an integrated fashion. 
 
To date, most shipment tracking information is based on following the conveyance that a 
shipment is using or the shipment’s location and status. Accurate tracking depends on 
timely reporting from the carriers hauling the shipment, the warehouseman storing it, or 
the distributor handling it. This is true for all short-range technologies (including all bar 
codes and RF devices). New technology using tags which can communicate directly with 
low-earth-orbiting-satellite (LEOS) systems offers the promise of freeing consignees 
from their reliance on carriers and other suppliers by allowing direct communications 
with the shipment. 
 
As lead times are becoming longer and less consistent, shippers should mitigate the 
problem by investing in visibility tools. Even in cases in which these tools provide only a 
partial coverage, they help moderate the problems by allowing timely responses. 
 
Improved Collaboration 
 
The focus of supply chain management is on interactions between enterprises in the 
chain. Collaboration among enterprises is what integrates the supply chain. 
 
Since the mid 1980s, American companies have devised many cooperative schemes to 
improve supply chain coordination.  These include vendor-managed-inventory (VMI) and 
co-managed inventory (CMI) in the retail industry, efficient consumer response (ECR) in 
the grocery industry, quick response (QR) in the textile industry, just-in-time (JIT) in 
manufacturing, and JIT II in high-technology procurement. Lately, collaborative 
planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) is taking hold in the consumer packaged 
goods industry and collaborative transportation management (CTM) is under 
development for the transportation industry. These and dozens of other such initiatives 
are aimed at ensuring that trading partners share information and coordinate forecasts and 
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replenishment orders, thus avoiding the unnecessary inventory fluctuations, often referred 
to as the “bullwhip” effect, which arise from uncoordinated channel decisions. (The 
bullwhip effect is described by Lee et al [3], based on Sterman [4] and [5] and on 
Forrester [6].) 
 
The Internet and electronic commerce in particular have enabled new collaborative 
processes between companies with the development of new standards, which allow more 
flexible and general computer-to-computer communications. New application software 
hosted by third party providers allows many trading partners to access their collaborative 
data simultaneously. 
 
As lead times are becoming more variable and forecasts less certain, companies should 
redouble their collaboration efforts. When the consignee knows about a problem early 
enough, it can take corrective measures (expedite shipment, go to an alternative source, 
adjust its own customer’s expectations, etc.) 
 
In addition to collaborating to improve supply chain performance, companies should 
work both with trading partners and with industry groups to develop best security 
practices and share growing expertise. More than ever, corporations should realize that 
their long-term fate is intertwined with that of their suppliers, customers, and even their 
competitors. Such collaboration has many precedents and is not limited to collaboration 
among US companies. For example, when the supremacy of the lean manufacturing and 
JIT became apparent, leading Japanese manufacturers, such as Toyota, allowed 
researchers from the world over to study their methods. In addition, they allowed other 
companies, including competitors, to visit their plants and study their manufacturing 
systems. (See, for example, Womack et al [7].) This is an example of the level of 
collaboration that will be required in the coming era. 
 
Risk Pooling 
 
One of the fundamentals of forecasting is that forecasts of more aggregate phenomena are 
more accurate.  For example, forecasts of nationwide sales figures are more accurate than 
store level forecasts and monthly forecasts are more accurate than daily forecasts.  To 
take advantage of this, firms employ a variety of strategies such as: 
 
• Postponement. By delaying the decision to make, configure, label, or ship a 
product to a particular destination, companies can reduce their forecasting error. 
 
For example, Billington and Johnson (2000) report that Hewlett-Packard cut 
printer supply costs by 25 percent with modular design and postponement. 
Generic printers are shipped to distribution centers worldwide, where local 
customization (involving local transformers, power cords, and instruction manuals 
in local language) takes place once firm orders are at hand. Thus, HP forecasts the 
aggregate demand for the generic printer, while requiring a disaggregate forecast 
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only for the local parts which are less expensive to stock and can be acquired with 
short lead-times. 
 
• Build-to-order. The ultimate postponement strategy is to build items only after 
customer orders are known. Dell Computer has used this strategy to become the 
world’s dominant PC maker. But even automobile manufacturers are embracing 
the strategy. For example, VW now delivers many of its models to German 
customers within two weeks of ordering. This means that VW has very few cars 
waiting for sale in dealers’ showrooms. 
 
• Product variability reduction. Some manufacturers have combated forecasting 
difficulties by reducing the number of options and items they offer. For example, 
many automobile manufacturers stopped offering all possible combination of 
features on their products and put forward “packages” of features instead. The 
smaller number of options allows for better risk pooling, lower variability and 
thus better forecasts and lower overall costs.  
 
• Centralized inventory management. By managing inventory centrally, companies 
can use surpluses in one area of the country to cover for deficits in others. This is 
another example of risk pooling by geographical aggregation. Thus the trend 
towards reducing the number of warehouses and other inventory stocking 
locations may accelerate as part of companies’ learning to operate in even more 
uncertain times. 
 
Public-Private partnership 
 
US executives often look at many government functions as hindrance to the smooth 
operation of the economy. Defense, however, is one of the few roles virtually no one 
wants the government to leave undone. In fact, the creation of an Army and a Navy were 
contemplated in the US constitution itself. 
 
The US government has taken the first step in organizing for the new environment by 
establishing the Office of Homeland Defense. At this point, the office is charged with 
coordinating the efforts of the various defense, intelligence, emergency response, health 
services and related agencies. The challenge is enormous, but the government is slowly 
rising to meet it. Protecting private interests, however vital to the nation, is still the 
purview of the owners of those private assets. 
 
Sharing information 
 
Recognizing the important role that government will play in the new era, and recognizing 
that government cannot do it alone, corporate executives need to start considering the 
government, both federal and local, as a partner in corporate life. Some possible 
collaborative avenues include the following: 
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• Use of the vast government know-how on the nature of threats and ways to deal with 
them. At the same time, corporations who may be subject to attacks have an 
obligation to inform local law enforcement and rescue agencies about their 
vulnerabilities. Companies in particularly sensitive businesses, such as nuclear power 
generation and chemical manufacturing are already subject to laws that require them 
to do so. In the new era, corporate executives should consider possible threats and 
work with local authorities even when they are not legally obligated to do so. 
 
• Many American corporations have operations all over the world and may possess 
information that is important to the national defense. Following the Cold War 
tradition, many corporations and individual executives may increase the level of 
information sharing with the US government. 
 
Assuming security roles and responsibilities 
 
The US has started to settle into a new long-term reality. This reality is marked by added 
security costs, added administrative costs, and longer, as well as less certain 
transportation times. Currently, however, the nation has not yet developed new long-term 
procedures that will be necessary to deal with the threats efficiently. The delays shippers 
and carriers experience today will be reduced as the US develops a more sustainable 
security system. Thus, firms should not yet over react to current transportation delays and 
added administrative costs. 
 
At this point, the philosophy behind cargo security checks mirrors airport checks in the 
US – inefficient and not very effective. By and large, US checkers at airports give the 
same level of attention to every passenger who goes through the system. In contrast, 
leading airports in Europe and Israel have always used an advanced “profiling” system to 
pre-screen, conduct quick interviews and then check more thoroughly certain passengers, 
while letting others go through.  
 
Similarly, many of the current processes used to insure the security of freight flows are 
inefficient and do not “scale” up.  The cost of stopping and checking all trucks at the 
Mexican or Canadian border or at a city's limits is unsustainably high. 
 
The freight equivalent of “profiling” is the use of certified carriers and shippers. Current 
government efforts are aimed at carriers with whom cargo liability lies. These carriers 
will have to be certified, based on training and a prescribed set of security processes. In 
addition, shippers should be certified as well for having approved security processes in 
place. Thus, for example, trucks owned by “certified carriers” hauling shipments from 
“certified shippers” may be waved through check-points (or just spot-checked). The idea 
of certifying the source (warehouse, plant, etc.) where a shipment is packaged is foreign 
to current regulations, which are aimed at carriers. As US businesses have learned from 
the quality movement, however, acting at the source can be both more efficient and more 
effective. 
  13
 
A version of this idea is included in FAA Directive 108-01-10 and its more recent “Cargo 
Revised Emergence Amendment.” The FAA attempts to distinguish between “known 
shippers” and “unknown shippers” in setting up procedures for acceptance of cargo by air 
carriers. The FAA does not address carrier certification since it is already familiar with 
all the air carriers. The problem of certifying carriers is most acute in the trucking 
industry. 
 
Corporations will take upon themselves some of the burdens of providing security. 
Shippers will be responsible for checking and sealing trailers at the origin, as well as 
checking the background of their transportation managers and warehouse and 
dockworkers. Carriers will develop security procedures for routing and scheduling 
sensitive cargo and check the background of all their employees. In addition, certified 
carriers will have the ability to track each of their vehicles at any point in its journey and 
be automatically alerted if the journey pattern changes. 
 
Leading carriers and shippers should work with the government on the creation of the 
certification program. Such certification programs are similar in nature to the ISO 9000 
programs used to certify quality. In fact, the government may choose to relegate the 
certification to private organizations, creating a structure similar to the quality programs. 
 
Interestingly, US Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner laid out a vision of a similar 
system in a speech at an importers conference on November 27, 2001. He suggested a 
government security certification program similar to the ISO 9000 quality certification 
process. Companies will be able to use a “fast lane” to enter the US if, for example, they 
will have certifiably secure processes at their loading docks and their offshore suppliers 
plants, if they share the cargo information with the customs service in a timely fashion, if 
they use electronic seals on their containers, etc. [8]. 
Hazardous materials 
 
More than 800,000 hazardous materials shipments move every day in the US alone, 94% 
of which are moved by truck. The transportation of hazardous materials deserves special 
attention in the fight against terror. The main elements of the existing system are: 
 
• The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act require that detailed 
information about hazardous substances in or near communities be available at the 
public's request.  
 
• The U.S. Department of Transportation employs a labeling and placarding system for 
identifying the types of hazardous materials that are transported along the nation's 
highways, railways, and waterways. This system enables local emergency officials to 
identify the nature and potential health threat of chemicals being transported.  
 
• In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) of 1986. Title III requires that each community establish a Local Emergency 
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Planning Committee (LEPC) to be responsible for developing an emergency plan for 
preparing for and responding to chemical emergencies in that community. The LEPC 
is required to review, test, and update the plan each year. 
 
The systems that are in place are aimed at efficient response to an accident involving 
hazardous material. Proposed new legislation increases fines for non-compliance and 
strengthens the US Department of Transportation inspectors’ authority to inspect cargo in 
transit. Separate legislation is aimed at tightening the rules for obtaining commercial 
drivers’ licenses.  
 
These legislative moves are appropriate and timely. The threat of terrorism calls for 
further control of the movements of hazardous materials so that the authorities can react 
after a trailer-load or a rail car loaded with hazardous materials is reported missing but 
before it is used in a terrorist attack. To this end the US may create a “HazMat 
Transportation Control System” similar to the air traffic control. Before trucks or rail cars 
will be allowed to depart they will file a “flight plan” and then be tracked to that plan 
throughout their journey. Deviations from the plan can be checked. 
 
Direct Emergency Assistance 
 
Modern, large corporations have access to extensive resources, which in many cases rival 
public resources. Some of these resources may have to be used as part of the homeland 
defense effort during wartime. 
 
This idea is not new; for example, US sealift strategy includes the use of the Merchant 
Marine fleet in case of war according to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was similarly established to organize civilian airliners to 
augment regular military airlift capability in a military emergency. 
 
Corporations should get ready to join in the national defense and in the rescue and 
recovery efforts that will follow. The corporate function that can provide the most help is 
logistics and transportation management. Logistics professionals should organize in every 
area of the US to prepare and help FEMA, the Red Cross and other agencies charged with 
alleviating emergencies and rebuilding affected communities. Most of these preparedness 
efforts involve the creation of local databases regarding the availability of transportation 
capacity to haul people and materiel; heavy earth moving and construction equipment; 
warehouse space and shipping and handling equipment; computers and communication 
hardware; etc. 
 
Organizing to meet the Challenge 
 
Many of the actions required for security and preparedness are in conflict with traditional 
corporate goals and processes. Consider, for example, the following trade-offs: 
  15
 
• Repeatability vs. unpredictability. In order to be successful and reduce the cost of 
performing their everyday activities, companies establish repeatable processes. 
Doing the same task over and over again means that workers get good at it, it is 
easy to measure and “perfect,” and easy to manage. In fact, when processes differ 
from the norm, companies generate another process to deal with exceptions – in 
an attempt to standardize even the outliers. 
 
Many aspects of security, however, require that companies be less predictable. 
For example, daily changes to the route that a truck carrying hazardous material is 
using, or frequent changes to password systems and other entry control systems to 
computers and facilities increases security. 
 
• The lowest bidder vs. the known supplier. To enhance security, companies may 
choose to deal with fewer suppliers on a long-term basis (as mentioned in the 
section Supplier relationships), but there might be substantial costs incurred in 
doing so. New suppliers often offer more competitive prices and they may bring 
with them new ideas and innovative processes. The same rationale applies to the 
choice of local vs. overseas suppliers discussed in that section. 
 
• Centralization vs. dispersion. In order to pool the forecasting risk, companies 
should manage inventory centrally (see the Inventory section).  Indeed, many 
corporate activities, from the provision of information technology to office work, 
are conducted better in a central location. Security considerations, however, call 
for dispersion of both assets and personnel in order to mitigate the effect of any 
local terrorist attack. 
 
• Managing risk vs. delivering value. The costs associated with new security 
measures are likely to be significant. The success of such measures cannot be 
measured by the value they deliver to customers, employees or shareholders day 
in and day out. Instead, these measures will be most successful if they are never 
actually tested. Consequently, it will be difficult to keep vigilant and keep 
investing in assets, personnel, inventory and processes that do not deliver value in 
the short term. 
 
• Collaboration vs. secrecy. Increased collaboration among enterprises makes 
supply chain management more efficient and avoids some of the increased costs 
of longer and less certain lead times and demand patterns (see the section 
Improved Collaboration). One of the tenets of security, however, is secrecy. 
While corporations may be exposing more of their data and internal workings to 
others and even sharing information about security measures with other 
corporations, they have to do so without compromising security. 
 
• Redundancy vs. efficiency. The preparatory steps that corporations may be taking 
regarding procurement policies, inventory management and knowledge backup 
(see the section Preparing for Another Attack), involve the creation of 
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redundancies in the system – be it extra supplier capacity, extra inventory, backup 
equipment and processes, etc. Such redundancies are, by their very nature, in 
direct conflict with “lean operations.” Redundancy calls for a “just in case” 
mentality while modern operations are organized around “just in time” systems. 
As argued in at the end of this section, the challenge in creating the required 
redundancies is to minimize their adverse effects and possibly, use them to create 
value.   
 
• Government cooperation vs. direct shareholder value. Many US executives are 
conditioned to put near-term shareholder value above all other considerations. 
The new environment may require cooperation with government and other 
companies, including competitors, even at the expense of short-term profit and 
near-term shareholder value. 
 
 
Just as the US has created an Office of Homeland Security, companies will often find it 
necessary to create a new office headed by a “Chief Security Officer” (CSO). The CSO 
must be, first and foremost, a businessperson who is familiar with the enterprise and in 
getting things done in a corporate environment. Organizations, perhaps like individuals, 
are subject to a strong temptation to return to normalcy. They gravitate toward return to 
the days when nobody had to worry about terrorism and bio-attacks. The CSO and the 
security organization will have to continuously fight this temptation. They will face many 
of the trade-offs mentioned above on a daily basis, and will have to create the 
constituency to follow through with the required investments and changes to corporate 
life.  Military or law enforcement background may not be the right mix for CSO 
candidates. Outsiders may be quickly marginalized in a corporate environment, unless 
they can understand the business itself and the trade-offs it routinely makes and argue for 
just the required measures and no more, while taking into account the normal business 
mission and objectives. 
 
The CSO should be the place in the organization where the various security schemes will 
be coordinated and tested, making sure that the enterprise can continue after an attack and 
that the emergency processes complement each other. For example, while it is clear that 
dispersion of work and personnel is a reasonable strategy to contain damage from 
physical terrorist attack, this strategy makes the enterprise more vulnerable to an Internet 
virus or worm attack that will impede communications and distributed applications.  
 
Another major business-preparedness role, which the CSO office should coordinate, is 
the use of simulation and optimization models to test various scenarios. Such models are 
readily available and can be adapted to contingency planning in terms of operating partial 
networks, using different ports of entry, responding to massively different demand 
scenarios, and adapting warehousing strategies to changing conditions. 
 
The CSO’s task, however, is much bigger than establishing and testing contingency 
plans. No Chief Security Officer or security organization will be successful unless the 
culture of the enterprise adds security consciousness to its daily life. Thus, companies 
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that will best survive terrorist attacks will be those whose employees have internalized a 
set of intelligent applications of security measures and the needed backup emergency 
processes. In that sense, the security challenge is similar to the drive to create a sales 
culture during the 1970s and the quality challenge of the 1980s. 
 
Efforts aimed at security can actually improve corporate performance and the preparation 
should be put in place with an eye towards reaping such “collateral benefits.” For 
example, better security measures can help reduce theft, embezzlement, and loss of 
intellectual property. They can help cement relationships with trading partners and 
accelerate the work of standard-setting organizations. Participation in community-wide 
efforts can also help the corporate image. Beyond the image, however, such efforts can 
empower employees and inject new meaning to their jobs, as strong corporations will be 
seen not only as a source of economic security to individuals but also as contributors to 
the greater good of the nation. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Terror is not a new world phenomenon and the US itself was no stranger to either suicide 
bombing or terrorist plots or attacks, especially in the last decade. The September 11 
attack demonstrated, however, the magnitude of the struggle in the new era and its far-
reaching dimensions.  
 
While European governments are in support of the US war on terrorism, it is the US that 
is the target of the current wave of terrorism and it is the US who is leading the charge 
against it, thereby exposing itself to retaliations. 
 
This struggle will challenge not only the armed forces of the US and its intelligence and 
law enforcement institutions, but it will change the way citizens in the Western world 
lead their lives and the way corporations conduct their business. This paper had focused 
on the last point – getting back to business in the new environment: cooperating with the 
government and adding security measures in order to prevent new attacks from taking 
place; creating redundancies so that enterprises can withstand such attacks; and changing 
corporate processes to cope with the heightened security environment. 
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